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Abstract
We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly model where goods are
horizontally and vertically di￿erentiated. While locations are chosen under quality un-
certainty, ￿rms choose prices and advertising expenditures being privately informed about
their types. We show that pure price separation is impossible, and that dissipative adver-
tising is necessary to ensure existence of separating equilibria. Equilibrium re￿nements
discard all pooling equilibria and select a unique separating equilibrium. When vertical
di￿erentiation is not too high, horizontal di￿erentiation is maximum, the high-quality
￿rm advertises, and both ￿rms adopt prices that are distorted upwards (compared to the
symmetric-information benchmark). When vertical di￿erentiation is high, ￿rms choose
identical locations and ex post, only the high-quality ￿rm obtains positive pro￿ts. In-
complete information and the subsequent signaling activity are shown to increase the set
of parameters values for which maximum horizontal di￿erentiation occurs.
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11 Introduction
Markets for experience goods are characterized by the uncertainty consumers face regarding
the utility they will get from purchasing and consuming these goods. In many situations,
consumers do not observe the objective quality of the commodity they intend to buy. In order
to avoid the standard ￿lemons￿ problem, emphasized by Akerlof (1970), producers may ￿nd
incentives to transmit some information to consumers. Since the pioneering work of Spence
(1973), an extensive literature has looked at the various strategies ￿rms can employ to reveal
information about their products’ quality. In particular, in their pathbreaking paper, Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) show how a monopolist can signal the high quality of a new experience
good by distorting his strategy (price, advertising intensity) compared to the benchmark
situation of complete information.1 Hence, signaling high quality is costly for the monopolist
because distorting strategies implies a reduction of pro￿ts.
However, the literature we refer to in analyzing a price signaling game has almost exclu-
sively focused on the monopoly case, where a producer with private information about his
high quality only ￿compete￿ with his ￿ghost￿ of low quality. To our knowledge, very few papers
are studying a similar price signaling game in a competitive environment. Among these few,
we can cite Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), Bagwell (1990), Bagwell and Ramey (1991), Fluet
and Garella (2002), Hertzendorf and Overgaard (1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2002). As Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (1998) mention, this emphasis on the monopoly case does not rely on the
belief that monopolized markets are more realistic, or common, neither does it stem from the
intuition that a monopoly is more likely to signal its type. The lack of work on oligopolistic
markets re￿ects the absence of a model, or a game, as tractable and coherent as the monopoly
game. Each of the papers treating the oligopoly case studies a particular setting, in order to
keep a balance between introducing competition and ensure tractability.
In this paper, we contribute to this emerging literature by considering the issue of signaling
quality in a duopolistic setting. More precisely, we study the impact of (horizontal) product
di￿erentiation on the existence and features of separating and pooling equilibria. We analyze
a model where both ￿rms choose their locations (variety) before competing in price and
purely dissipative advertising. One of the duopolists will have a quality advantage, which is
1See also Bagwell and Riordan (1991).
2exogenously selected by Nature, but the identity of the better quality product will remain
unknown to consumers before actual consumption.2 We will assume that qualities are perfectly
negatively correlated, to illustrate the fact that consumers, knowing goods will be vertically
di￿erentiated, face some uncertainty concerning which ￿rm produces the better quality, and to
￿gure out whether the high-quality ￿rm will be able to provide them with enough information
to be unambiguously identi￿ed. An important feature of our model is that the duopolists will
have to choose their locations under uncertainty, that is before knowing which quality they
will be able to produce. Hence, only the probability distribution of quality is known at the
location-choice stage.
This assumption about the timing can be justi￿ed as follows.3 Consider a market on
which two ￿rms enter into a Research and Development race. One of the duopolists will win
this race and be able to bene￿t from a new technology which will ensure the production of a
good of quality higher than the competitor’s. Nevertheless, ￿rms have to make a long-term
decision as to the variety of their goods (for example, one can think of a choice of ingredients,
components, or marketing or distribution channels) before knowing the result of the R&D
race and thus their exact quality. After location decisions are made, which ￿rm wins the
R&D race and thus produces which quality is exogenously determined. Finally, both ￿rms
simultaneously compete in price and dissipative advertising. Consumers perfectly observe
locations, prices and advertising expenditures, but not qualities. Note that our assumption
that quality is revealed to ￿rms only after locations are chosen rules out the possibility that
duopolists may use location as a signal of their types.4
Another motivation for this timing may be derived from some stylized facts observed in
several sectors. For instance, producers of agricultural goods or food commodities will have
to make long-term decision on the variety of their produce, before knowing the actual quality
of the ￿nal good. Indeed, quality is often variable for many food commodities because it is
linked to the quality of raw inputs which is largely in￿uenced by exogenous factors such as
2It is worth noting that Gabszewicz and Grilo (1992) studied price competition in a duopoly when consumers
are uncertain about which ￿rm sells which quality. A signi￿cant di￿erence with our paper and H&O’s is that
Gabszewicz and Grilo assume that consumers’ beliefs are exogenous, such that no inference from prices can
be considered.
3We thank Esther Gal-or for suggesting this motivation of the timing of the game.
4This alternative timing where duopolists may signal their type through two instruments, location and
price, is studied by Vettas (1999). Vettas shows that a high-quality ￿rm will signal its type by choosing to
locate closer to its rival (relative to the complete information benchmark).
3climatic ones (seasonal quality of fresh inputs such as fruits). Nevertheless, food processors
have to take observable long term decisions such as packaging, content per unit, the type of
retailing channel (supermarkets versus specialized retailers), before processing the product.
To further motivate our timing, consider also the often invoked example of restaurants
with no established reputation in a tourist resort. Restaurant owners might have to choose
the style of cuisine (Italian versus French cuisine) before hiring the chef whose ability will
determine the quality of food. We argue that this commitment to a speci￿c variety, i.e. a
choice of location, is a chance for a ￿rm to bene￿t from a speci￿c market (a niche), on which
it might bene￿t from enough market power to be able to signal through prices the true quality
of the product to consumers. Nonetheless, at the time the ￿rm chooses a variety or location,
it does not know what the actual quality of his commodity will be at the ￿nal stage.
Our main results are as follows. We ￿rst prove that any separating equilibrium involves
strictly positive advertising expenditures by the high-quality ￿rm, whatever the quality dif-
ferential. This ￿rst result is interesting in itself. Contrary to Fluet and Garella (2002) or
Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a), dissipative advertising is necessary to signal high qual-
ity, even when the quality di￿erential is high, and despite the fact that marginal costs of
production increase with quality. This latter characteristic of the model would ensure ex-
istence of pure price separation in a monopoly game, but does not in the present context.
Second, our results show that both low- and high-quality prices will be distorted upwards,
compared to the symmetric information benchmark. This ￿nding contrasts with Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2001a) where it is shown that prices may be distorted downwards (com-
pared to the relevant symmetric information case) when the quality di￿erential is relatively
small and the separating equilibrium involves positive advertising expenditures to reveal high
quality.
Were advertising prohibited, or just impossible, the high-quality ￿rm would have to distort
its price, downward or upward, as the only way to reveal its actual type. An upward distortion
is excluded because it would result in such a high price that all consumers would give up
purchasing the high-quality good and switch to the low-quality one. Signaling high quality
with a high price would drive all costumers away and thus be too costly for the producer. A
downward price distortion would have the opposite e￿ect: all consumers would purchase the
4high-quality good, and the low-quality ￿rm would have no demand to serve and hence would
make zero pro￿t. As a consequence, this latter ￿rm has no opportunity cost of cheating and
mimicking its rival’s choice. The high-quality ￿rm cannot prevent its low-quality competitor
from mimicking its choice of price, and thus a low price cannot constitute a separating strategy
to reveal high quality.
As is usually the case in signaling games, a multitude of separating and pooling equilibria
of the price-advertising subgame are characterized. In order to solve the ￿rst stage of the
game, it is crucial to be able to select the ones that are the most plausible, on which ￿rms
will most likely focus. We introduce two re￿nements criteria, which require consumers out-
of-equilibrium beliefs to be ￿rst resistant to a deviation to another equilibrium strategy,
then intuitive. The ￿rst requirement places restrictions on beliefs after a deviation o￿ the
equilibrium path that is still consistent with an alternative separating equilibrium. Consumers
beliefs should re￿ect the opportunity of receiving two messages, such that if they observe a
deviation by one ￿rm, they can still rely on the information transmitted by the non-deviating
one, particularly when the deviation is to an action that could belong to another separating
pro￿le. This re￿nement yields a unique separating equilibrium pro￿le where the high-quality
￿rm reveals its type with the least costly pair of price and advertising expenditures. This
strategy pro￿le is also characterized by an upward distortion in both low- and high-quality
prices, compared to the symmetric information benchmark. The second requirement on beliefs
is reminiscent from the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987), and discards all pooling
equilibria as implausible.
Equilibrium selection enables us to characterize equilibrium location choices. Maximal or
minimal horizontal di￿erentiation occurs, depending on parameters. In the present model,
a crucial parameter is the relative degree of vertical di￿erentiation, measured by the ratio
between quality discrepancy and transportation cost. When this parameter’s value is lower
than a certain threshold, horizontal di￿erentiation is maximum. Above this threshold, quality
di￿erential is so large that ￿rms choose identical locations: The perspective of obtaining the
entire market outweighs the incentive to horizontally di￿erentiate.
Our results also shed some light on the impact of asymmetric information on horizontal
di￿erentiation. On this topic, Boyer et al. (1994, 1995), Bester (1998) and Vettas (1999)
5all conclude that incomplete information about the type of a duopolist yields less horizontal
di￿erentiation. On the contrary, in our setting, the likelihood of observing maximum di￿eren-
tiation increases under incomplete information. It then appears that asymmetric information
allows the low-quality ￿rm to better resist an increasingly e￿cient competitor. Note however
that in the papers cited above, location is distorted in order to signal a ￿rm’s type, which is
not the case in our framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to the benchmark situation of symmetric information. Section 4 introduces
asymmetric information and examines the interactions between location choices and signaling
through price and advertising. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a continuum of consumers whose locations are uniformly distributed over the unit
interval [0;1]. Two ￿rms, labeled by i = 1;2, choose a location yi 2 [0;1]. Without loss of
generality, we assume that y1 · y2.
A consumer located in x 2 [0;1] gets a utility from purchasing a unit of good i that is
speci￿ed as
U(pi;qi) = R + qi ¡ pi ¡ t(x ¡ yi)2; for i = 1;2; (1)
where R > 0 is the basic utility obtained by a consumer purchasing any of the two goods,
and qi and pi represent respectively the quality and the price of the good. A consumer’s
transportation cost of visiting a ￿rm located in yi is quadratic, and the parameter t re￿ects
the degree of horizontal product di￿erentiation.5 We assume that R is su￿ciently large that
consumers always choose to purchase either from ￿rm 1 or ￿rm 2. Notice that we also assume
perfect homogeneity of consumers with respect to their valuation of quality.
We assume that q1 6= q2: the goods are exogenously vertically di￿erentiated. For the
sake of simplicity, we will suppose that quality can only take one of two values, L or H.
Therefore, we will have qi = L and qj = H, where L and H stand for low and high quality
respectively. We will denote ¢ ´ H ¡ L the quality discrepancy. The assumption that
5This speci￿cation of the utility function is widely retained in the literature. See for instance Bester (1998),
Vettas (1999), Christou and Vettas (2005).
6qualities are perfectly negatively correlated illustrates the interesting case where consumers
are faced with two goods of distinct qualities, one for which they are all willing to pay more,
everything else being equal. The issue at stake is whether or not they will be provided with
enough information to avoid being wronged by the ￿rm producing low quality.6
Firms have constant marginal cost of production c(qi), and we assume that this cost is
increasing with quality. Indeed, producing high quality requires more inputs, or inputs of
better quality that are more costly than the ones necessary to produce low quality. We
normalize the unit cost of low quality c(L) to 0 and we denote the unit cost of high quality
by c(H) = c > 0. We assume that ¢ > c, which basically means that the production of high
quality is socially valuable.7 Adverting expenditures, ai, enter pro￿t functions as a sunk cost
and do not in￿uence demand functions.
For further reference, we introduce the following crucial parameter, ½ ´ ¢¡c
t . This ratio
captures the importance of vertical di￿erentiation relative to horizontal di￿erentiation, and
will be referred to as the relative quality di￿erential.
We analyze the following game:
² In a ￿rst stage, ￿rms simultaneously choose their locations, while they are still uncertain
of their respective type.
² Then, in a second stage, they learn the quality of the good they will produce.
² Finally, they simultaneously compete in price and dissipative advertising, and consumers
decide which good to purchase.
The choice of location is made under uncertainty as to the quality of the good. In stage 2, ￿rms
privately learn their own and rival’s type. Consumers do not directly observe qualities, but
6Recall that the production of high-quality results from a R&D race that only one ￿rm can win. The
winning ￿rm will o￿er quality H greater than its rival’s quality, L. Another way to justify the negative
correlation between the two qualities is the following. Suppose that ￿rms qualities qi, i = 1;2, were two
independent random variables, each following a normal cdf N(0;¾i). Then, (qi ¡ qj) would also follow a
normal cdf, with the probability that qi = qj equal to zero. Furthermore, Prob (qi ¡ qj > 0) = 0:5. To
represent this situation in a simple and tractable way, we consider only two cases, qi = L and qj = H, i 6= j,
with Prob (qi = H) =
1
2, such that Prob (qi ¡ qj > 0) = 0:5, and will discuss how our results depend on
¢ = H ¡ L.
7In the inverse case where c > ¢, it can be shown that the problem rapidly degenerates to one in which
only the low-quality ￿rm is pro￿table. In particular, it can be shown that the set of parameter values for
which a separating equilibrium could exist requires that t > ¢. This latter inequality implies that horizontal
di￿erentiation e￿ects dominate vertical di￿erentiation ones. In such a case, the high-quality ￿rm is never
going to be willing to use costly signals to reveal a quality that consumers will not ￿nd interesting to purchase
anyway.
7they know that products are vertically di￿erentiated. In other words, consumers perfectly
observe locations but remain uninformed about which ￿rm o￿ers the highest quality. The
question is whether ￿rms will manage to signal their types at the last stage.
There is no reason to believe a priori that one ￿rm is more likely to produce high qual-
ity, hence we will assume that Nature draws ￿rms’ types from a prior, commonly known,
probability distribution Prob (qi = H) = 1=2. Since ￿rms are ex ante symmetric, and con-
sumers’ preferences follow a symmetric density, it is quite natural to think that incentives to
horizontally di￿erentiate will be symmetric, and that we could focus on symmetric locations,
y1 = 1 ¡ y2 ´ y. As a matter of fact, symmetric equilibria will encompass all the qualita-
tively interesting situations. Christou and Vettas (2005) analyze how locations are chosen
by duopolists under quality uncertainty, in a model very similar to ours.8 Their results ex-
hibit equilibria in which horizontal di￿erentiation is either maximum or minimum. In the
latter case, ￿rms can choose identical locations which can be (almost) anywhere on the linear
city. They do not ￿nd any equilibria in which ￿rms would locate asymmetrically by choosing
distinct strategies.9 By restricting ourselves to symmetric equilibria, we restrict ourselves to
minimum di￿erentiation equilibria where ￿rms are necessarily located at the center. We ex-
clude equilibria where ￿rms are located at some other point on the line. Nevertheless, it will
be easy to check that those latter equilibria would be qualitatively identical to the symmetric
one we derive. When di￿erentiation is minimum, whether ￿rms are located at the center or
at some other point on the line does not in￿uence equilibrium prices and pro￿ts. Therefore,
assuming symmetric locations from the start simpli￿es the exposition of the model and of its
resolution, while still capturing all qualitatively interesting outcomes.
Considering only symmetric locations also means that the identity of the ￿rm (that is,
whether we are considering ￿rm 1 or ￿rm 2) is irrelevant when we look for ￿rms’ optimal
strategies. What matters is the quality each ￿rm produces. Therefore, we rede￿ne location as
y ´ y1 = 1 ¡ y2, and denote pL and pH prices of the low- and high-quality ￿rm, respectively.
8They assume that the random variable qi¡qj is uniformly distributed on some interval whereas we assume
that it follows a Bernoulli distribution.
9We ￿nd no reasons to believe that our setting would induce such asymmetric equilibria.
83 Benchmark case: symmetric information
Building on Vettas (1999) and Christou and Vettas (2005), this section proposes a solution
to the game under symmetric information. It has two purposes. One is to introduce some
notations and to derive some results that will turn out to be useful later in the paper, when
solving the game under incomplete information. The other one is to show what are the forces
driving ￿rms to choose their locations and prices.
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the last stage of the game, where
￿rms simultaneously compete in price and advertising, for given locations y and 1 ¡ y. Here,
￿rms as well as consumers observe the actual quality of the two goods. Note that since
advertising is purely dissipative, it has no e￿ect on demand, such that ￿rms will optimally
choose not to advertise. Then in a second step we will solve the location stage, where both
￿rms rationally anticipate equilibrium prices and choose locations, not knowing their types.
We analyze the case where Firm 1 produces low quality and Firm 2 high quality. As the game
is symmetric, we can denote pL and pH the respective prices of the goods of low and high
quality.
3.1 Price equilibria
Demand functions depend on the location of the marginal consumer who is indi￿erent between
the two products. We assume that parameter values are such that, in equilibrium, the market
is entirely covered. We denote zB(pL;pH) 2 [0;1] the location of the marginal consumer.10
Its identity is given by
L ¡ pL ¡ t(zB ¡ y)2 = H ¡ pH ¡ t(zB ¡ 1 + y)2:
Solving this equation in zB gives
zB(pL;pH) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if pL ¸ pH ¡ ¢ + td






10In what follows, the superscript B denotes benchmark values of all variables.
9where d ´ 1 ¡ 2y denotes the distance between the two ￿rms.
We denote pro￿t functions ¼B
L = pLzB and ¼B
H = (pH ¡ c)(1 ¡ zB). Looking for a Nash
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3 [3td + ¢ + 2c] otherwise.
The condition on d means that if ￿rms are too close to each other (the distance between
them is too small) the low-quality ￿rm will not have a positive market share. In this case,
the high-quality ￿rm charges a limit price and gets the entire demand. Note that there is a
market for the low quality good if d >
½
3, which can happen only if ½ < 3.
Note also that if qualities were identical (i.e., ¢ = 0 and c = 0), then price competition
would correspond to a standard Hotelling setting with quadratic transportation costs and
homogeneous products (see D’Aspremont et al. (1979)). When qualities di￿er (i.e. ¢ > 0,
c > 0), each ￿rm obtains a strictly positive demand only when ￿rms are located su￿ciently
far apart. If ￿rms are too close to each other, such that d <
½
3 , the high-quality ￿rm gets
the whole demand. In particular if d = 0, then pB
L = 0 and pB
H = ¢, and the low-quality ￿rm
is excluded. This is the standard outcome in a duopoly where di￿erentiation is only vertical
and consumers have homogenous tastes for quality.







18d [3d ¡ ½]












18d [3d + ½]
2 if d >
½
3;
t(½ ¡ d) otherwise.
(5)
3.2 Location equilibria
We now turn to the ￿rst stage of the game, where ￿rms choose their locations while still
uncertain about the quality of the good they will produce later. A ￿rm’s expected pro￿t,
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Note that for d > ½=3,
dE¦(d)
dd > 0: ￿rms have incentives to maximize distance between them.








(9 + ½2) ¸ E¦(0) =
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Therefore, we can state the following result:
Proposition 1 The outcome of the game under symmetric information involves either max-
imal di￿erentiation or minimal di￿erentiation depending on the value of ½: More precisely,
(i) for ½ 2 [0;1:146], there is maximum horizontal di￿erentiation (d = 1) and both ￿rms are
active and obtain strictly positive pro￿ts,
(ii) for ½ > 1:146, there is minimum horizontal di￿erentiation (d = 0) and only the high-
quality ￿rm obtains positive pro￿ts.
11The values of equilibrium prices and pro￿ts are summarized in Table 1. Ex post, ￿rms are
asymmetric: one of them will have the advantage of producing higher quality. Nevertheless,
the uncertainty concerning the quality of the good they will produce implies that ￿rms are
ex ante symmetric, such that they have identical incentives to di￿erentiate. The parameter ½
indicates a relative quality advantage: the higher it is, the more likely ￿rms will want to take
the chance of locating in the middle of the market, with the hope of monopolizing the market
at the ￿nal stage.
prices expected pro￿ts ex-post pro￿ts





½ 2 [0;1:146] t(1 ¡ ½=3) c + t(1 + ½=3) t
18(9 + ½2) t
18(3 ¡ ½)2 t
18(3 + ½)2
½ > 1:146 0 ¢ t
2½ 0 t½
Table 1: Equilibrium values for prices and pro￿ts
4 Signaling quality
We now turn to the incomplete information framework in which consumers do not ascertain
goods qualities before purchase. At the last stage of the game, consumers have to choose
between commodities o￿ered by ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2. They observe locations and are aware
these were chosen before ￿rms learned their types, and they know that goods are of di￿erent
qualities. But consumers do not know which ￿rm produces which quality. Their prior belief
about ￿rm 1 producing high quality is ¹0 = 1=2. The question is whether ￿rms can signal
their types, and if so, how the possibility of signaling at the last stage of the game in￿uences
their previous choice of locations.
4.1 Strategies, beliefs, and equilibrium de￿nition
Firms ￿rst choose locations, before they learn their types. Each ￿rm knows it will produce
high quality with probability 1/2. Then ￿rms privately learn their types. They each o￿er a
price for their good and simultaneously determine their expenditures in dissipative advertising.
Finally, consumers, observing these variables, try to infer some information about which ￿rm
produces which quality and make their choice. Strategies for ￿rms are:
12Location Firm 1 and ￿rm 2 simultaneously choose their location y and 1 ¡ y, which deter-
mines the degree of horizontal di￿erentiation d.
Price and advertising expenditures Each ￿rm i, i = 1;2, can have one of two types L or
H. Firm i’s strategy pro￿le is a vector of price-advertising actions ((piL;aiL);(piH;aiH)).
Since the game is symmetric, ((piL;aiL);(piH;aiH)) = ((pjL;ajL);(pjH;ajH)): We will
hence be interested in strategy pro￿les of the form ((pL;aL);(pH;aH)), identical for
both ￿rms.
We assume that advertising expenditures ai enter ￿rm i’s pro￿t function as a ￿xed cost. Given
locations, consumers observe two pairs of price and advertising expenditures ((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)),
Q;K 2 fL;Hg, and update their belief about which ￿rm produces which quality. Denote
¹((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)) 2 [0;1] the probability that the ￿rm choosing the pair (pQ;aQ) pro-
duces high quality, conditional on ((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)) being observed.
This two-stage game will be solved by backward induction. At the ￿nal stage of the game,
for given locations, each ￿rm chooses price and advertising expenditures maximizing its pro￿t
function, that we denote ¼Q(pQ;aQ;pK;aK;¹) when it produces quality Q, and is perceived
by consumers as producing high quality with probability ¹ = ¹((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)).
At the ￿rst stage, ￿rms compute their expected pro￿ts as E¦(d) ´ 1
2¦L(d) + 1
2¦H(d),
where ¦Q(d) is the subgame payo￿ of the ￿rm producing quality Q at the ￿nal stage.
The game under study is a game with imperfect information and observed actions, for
which we are looking for perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE). We limit our analysis to pure
strategy equilibria. These can be of two types: separating or pooling. In a separating equi-
librium, ￿rms choose di￿erent pairs of price and advertising expenditure that truly reveal
their type. Strategies are such that consumers correctly infer the true quality of each good.
Conversely, in a pooling equilibrium, both ￿rms charge the same price and choose the same
level of advertising, which does not allow consumers to infer any more information than the
one they have a priori .
De￿nition 1 A vector fd;pL;aL;pH;aH;¹(:;:)g characterizes a pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium if:
(a) For any given d, (pL;aL) = argmaxp;a ¼L (p;a;pH;aH;¹((p;a);(pH;aH))):
13(b) For any given d, (pH;aH) = argmaxp;a ¼H (p;a;pL;aL;¹((p;a);(pL;aL))):
(c) If (pH;aH) 6= (pL;aL) then ¹((pH;aH);(pL;aL)) = 1 = 1 ¡ ¹((pL;aL);(pH;aH)):
(d) If (pH;aH) = (pL;aL) then ¹((pH;aH);(pL;aL)) = ¹((pL;aL);(pH;aH)) = 1
2:
(e) d 2 argmaxE¦(d) = 1
2¦L(d) + 1
2¦H(d):
Conditions (a) and (b) require that each ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t, given its rival’s strat-
egy and consumers posterior beliefs. Requirements (c) and (d) state that beliefs must be
consistent with the structure of the game and ￿rms’ strategies. Namely, when ￿rms choose
di￿erent actions, consumers will correctly infer which ￿rm produces which quality. Conversely,
if actions are identical, consumers cannot update their beliefs and must revert to their prior
ones. Note that those requirements on beliefs only refer to observations of equilibrium strate-
gies. Finally, Condition (e) requires each ￿rm to choose its location optimally, anticipating
equilibrium prices and advertising strategies, and consumers’ beliefs.
In order to write conditions for the existence of separating equilibria, we need to comple-
ment De￿nition 1 by restricting beliefs a little further. As we will see in the next subsection,
a ￿rm always has the possibility of mimicking its rival’s strategy. But contrary to a monopoly
game, this deviation does not necessarily constitute a deviation on the equilibrium path, such




















L)) refers to any arbitrary pairs of identical actions. Since the ￿rms
are ex ante symmetric, observing two identical pairs of actions does not enable consumers
to infer any new information or to believe that one ￿rm was more likely to deviate than the
other.
4.2 Separating equilibria
When consumers observe a pro￿le ((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)), they update their beliefs such that
¹ ´ ¹((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)) = Prob (Q = H j(pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)). The indi￿erent consumer
14located in z¤ is such that
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0 if pQ ¸ pK + td ¡ (1 ¡ 2¹)¢






Pro￿t functions are denoted
¼Q (pQ;aQ;pK;¹) = (pQ ¡ c(Q))z¤(pQ;pK;¹) ¡ aQ
¼K (pK;aK;pQ;¹) = (pK ¡ c(K))(1 ¡ z¤(pQ;pK;¹)) ¡ aK
where ¹ = ¹((pQ;aQ);(pK;aK)).11
The necessary conditions for the strategy pro￿le ((pL;aL);(pH;aH)) to be a separating
pro￿le are:

















Conditions (ICL) and (ICH) are implied by (a), (b) and (d’) of De￿nition 1. Namely, by
construction of the belief system, each type of ￿rm has the possibility of mimicking the
strategy of its rival of the other type, thereby confusing consumers. Condition (10) stipulates
that in a separating equilibrium the low-quality ￿rm, facing the worst possible beliefs and
being perfectly identi￿ed by consumers, should optimize accordingly.
11Note that we have suppressed the variable ai in ¼j since ¼j only depends on ai through beliefs ¹.
15The no-mimicking conditions (8) and (9) can be rewritten as:
ICL : aH ¸ maxfaH (pH;pL;aL);0g (11)





pH + aL ¡ pLz¤(pL;pH;0)
and
aH (pH;pL;aL) = (pH ¡ c)(1 ¡ z¤(pL;pH;0)) ¡
1
2
(pL ¡ c) + aL:
The expenditure aH represents the minimum level of dissipative advertising that the high-
quality ￿rm must incur to deter a low-quality ￿rm from mimicking its strategy. Conversely, aH
is the highest level of advertising sustainable for a high-quality ￿rm in a separating equilibrium,
above which the high-quality ￿rm would rather be mistaken for a low-quality ￿rm. Hence, on
the one hand, advertising expenditures must be su￿ciently high to prevent the low-quality
￿rm from mimicking, and on the other hand, they must not be so high that separation is no
longer pro￿table for the high-quality ￿rm.
Recall from Condition (10) that in a separating equilibrium, the low-quality ￿rm faces the
worst possible beliefs and is perfectly identi￿ed by consumers. Therefore, this ￿rm will maxi-
mize its pro￿t accordingly and consequently, its best response to its competitor is identical to
the one that would prevail under symmetric information. This yields to the following result.
Lemma 1 In any separating equilibrium pro￿le, the low-quality ￿rm chooses pL = pB
L(pH) =
1
2[pH + td ¡ ¢] and aL = 0:
Intuitively, the low-quality ￿rm has no better choice than playing its symmetric-information
best price response and hence is not willing to spend money in wasteful advertising. Using
Lemma 1, we are now able to characterize the set of potential separating equilibrium pro￿les
((pH;aH);(pL;aL)) = ((pH;aH);(pB

















16together with the non-negativity condition for ￿rms’ demands,
0 · z¤(pB
L(pH);pH;0) · 1; (14)
and the condition pH ¸ c for positive margin.
Lemma 2 The set ­ of admissible separating prices pH and advertising expenditures aH,















pH 2 [¢ ¡ td;¢ + td] if d · ½
pH 2 [2c + td ¡ ¢;¢ + td] if d > ½
Proof: See Appendix A.¥
Given this characterization, we are now able to state the main result on the existence of
separating equilibria.
Proposition 2 Any strategy pro￿le ((pH;aH);(pL;aL)) such that (pH;aH) 2 ­ and (pL;aL) =
¡1
2[pH + td ¡ ¢];0
¢
can be paired with a system of beliefs to form a separating equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B.¥
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that considering beliefs that satisfy De￿nition 1 and the
following requirements:
¹((p;a);(pH;aH)) = 0 for any (p;a) = 2 f((pH;aH);(pL;aL)g
¹((pL;aL);(p;a)) = 1 for any (p;a) = 2 f(pH;aH);(pL;aL)g
is su￿cient to support any pro￿le ((pH;aH);(pL;aL)) such that (pH;aH) 2 ­ and (pL;aL) =
¡1
2[pH + td ¡ ¢];0
¢
as part of a separating equilibrium. With such beliefs, consumers infer
from any deviation that the deviating ￿rm o￿ers low quality and that the non deviating ￿rm
o￿ers high quality.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate the set of separating equilibria in the space (pH;aH), depend-
ing on the di￿erent values that the parameter ½ can take. An important consequence of our
result is that purely dissipative advertising is absolutely necessary for the high-quality ￿rm
17to reveal its type in a separating equilibrium. This holds whatever the gap between quali-
ties or the distance between ￿rms. This contrasts with the results obtained by Hertzendorf
and Overgaard (2001a) and Fluet and Garella (2002), who suggest that when the quality
di￿erential is su￿ciently high, price signaling alone is su￿cient to get separation.
An intuition for our result unfolds as follows. It can be shown that if advertising were not
possible the high-quality ￿rm would have to distort its price downward in order to prevent
imitation by the low-quality ￿rm (one can observe this by extrapolating the curves aH and
aH in Figures 1, 2 and 3 until they cross the horizontal axis). But such a low price would
then allow the high-quality ￿rm to appropriate the entire demand, leaving its competitor
with zero pro￿t. As the low-quality ￿rm gets nothing, it has nothing to lose from choosing
any other price: Its opportunity cost of deviating is null. Therefore, its incentive compatible
constraint not to deviate cannot be satis￿ed, since it is always worthwhile imitating any price
the high-quality ￿rm could choose and have a chance to get a positive share of the demand.
4.3 Pooling equilibria
We now turn to the study of pooling equilibria. In a pooling equilibrium, both ￿rms set the
same price p and the same advertising expenditure a. Consumers are therefore unable to infer
any information about quality, so that their posterior beliefs are identical to their prior ones:
¹((p;a);(p;a)) = 1
2: Firms will therefore split the market equally. Let us denote ¡ the set of
pooling equilibrium strategies (p;a). We de￿ne out-of-equilibrium beliefs as being pessimistic,
such that given a putative pooling equilibrium strategy pro￿le ((p;a);(p;a)), consumers infer
from any unilateral deviation (p0;a0) 6= (p;a) that the deviating ￿rm produces low quality:
¹((p0;a0);(p;a)) = 1¡¹((p;a);(p0;a0)) = 0. Hence, the set ¡ is characterized by the following

























Studying conditions (15) and (16) gives rise to the following Proposition.
18Proposition 3 For d ¸ c2=16¢t, the set ¡ is non empty and de￿ned by
0 · a · minfaH(p;p;0); aH(p ¡ c;p ¡ c;0)g
td + ¢ + c ¡ 2
p
¢td · p · td + ¢ + 2
p
¢td:
Any (p;a) 2 ¡ can be supported as a pooling equilibrium with the following system of beliefs:
¹((p;a);(p;a)) = 1
2 and ¹((p0;a0);(p;a)) = 1 ¡ ¹((p;a);(p0;a0)) = 0 for any (p0;a0) 6= (p;a).
Proof: See Appendix C.¥
When the distance between ￿rms is su￿ciently high, there is an in￿nity of pooling equi-
libria, some of which are characterized by positive advertising expenditures. Note however
that when c2=16¢t > 1, there does not exist any pooling equilibrium.
4.4 Selecting an equilibrium
As we ultimately want to solve the ￿rst stage of the game, i.e. the location stage, we need to
select a plausible equilibrium for the price-advertising competition subgame. Given the results
contained in the previous two subsections, we are left with two di￿erent regimes. First, when
the gap between qualities is su￿ciently small (¢ < c2=16t) only separating equilibria exist
and second, when there is su￿cient distance between ￿rms (1 ¸ d ¸ c2=16¢t), pooling and
separating equilibria co-exist.
The multiplicity of equilibria is a common feature in signaling games, and is due to the
lack of restrictions on beliefs after a deviation o￿ the equilibrium path. In monopoly signaling
games, well-known re￿nements of the equilibrium concept are applied to prune the set of
equilibria, such as the Intuitive Criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987)). The idea of the Intuitive
Criterion is to eliminate equilibria that rely on implausible beliefs, where beliefs are considered
implausible if they put a positive probability on one type of the sender deviating to a strategy
that is equilibrium dominated for him, while it is not for his alter ego of the other type.
But in our context, there are two senders, and consumers receive two messages. This
implies that we cannot apply the Intuitive Criterion without some modi￿cations, but also
that we might not have to apply it so straightforwardly. For instance, consider a separating
equilibrium from which one of the two senders deviates. The new feature with respect to
19a monopoly signaling game is that consumers can still infer some information from the non
deviating sender, and can (and should) use this to construct beliefs o￿ the equilibrium path.
Therefore, a deviation from an informative equilibrium might not have any consequences for
consumers, because their beliefs can remain unchanged as long as the other sender’s strategy
remains consistent with a separating equilibrium. If we require consumers to follow such a
logic, separating equilibria can be tested without systematically testing for equilibrium dom-
ination (as the Intuitive Criterion requires). Such a test, requiring beliefs to be unprejudiced,
can be found in Bagwell and Ramey (1991) and Schultz (1999). As Hertzendorf and Over-
gaard (2001a), we will apply a restricted version of Bagwell and Ramey’s unprejudiced beliefs,
requiring an equilibrium pro￿le to be Resistant to Equilibrium Defections (REDE). This re-
quirement will discipline beliefs following not any deviation, but those ones that belong to the
set of potential separating pro￿les.
The de￿nition of an equilibrium pro￿le that is REDE happens to have a ￿avor close to the
de￿nition of undefeated equilibrium by Mailath et al. (1993). The idea common to these two
de￿nitions is that, when observing a ￿rm deviating from a proposed equilibrium, consumers
should consider whether this deviation and its subsequent outcome is consistent with another
equilibrium. If so, their beliefs should re￿ect this consistency. In the present framework, if
consumers observe a deviation from a separating pro￿le to a price-advertising pair that could
be chosen by the high-quality ￿rm in an alternative separating equilibrium, while the other
price-advertising pair is consistent with a low-quality ￿rm’s choice, then consumers’ out-of-
equilibrium beliefs should put a positive probability on the high-quality ￿rm deviating. As
we show below, imposing this requirement on beliefs reduces the set of separating equilibrium
pro￿les to a unique one, in which the high-quality ￿rm signals its type with the least costly
pair of price and advertising expenditures.
The requirement on beliefs to be REDE has no grip on pooling equilibria, since in that
case a deviation from the equilibrium leaves consumers with an equilibrium message from
which they cannot infer any information. In that case, the logic of the Intuitive Criterion
will be relevant, and consumers will be required not to put a positive belief on deviations (or
messages) that are equilibrium dominated for one type of the deviating sender, but not for
the other type.
204.4.1 Re￿ning separating equilibria
In a separating equilibrium as de￿ned in Proposition 2, consumers expect to observe ((pL;aL);(pH;aH))





. Equilibrium beliefs are thus ¹((pL;aL); (pH;aH)) =
0. This pro￿le is supported as a separating equilibrium by the following belief system:
¹((p;a);(pH;aH)) = 0 for any (p;a) = 2 f(pH;aH);(pL;aL)g
¹((pL;aL);(p;a)) = 1 for any (p;a) = 2 f(pH;aH);(pL;aL)g:
The second part of this system requires consumers to believe that the ￿rm that chose (pL;aL)
is of the high quality type, whereas the one that chose the strategy (p;a) is of the low
quality type, even if (p;a) 2 ­, that is even if the high-quality ￿rm deviates to a strategy
consistent with an alternative separating equilibrium. Such a belief o￿ the equilibrium path
induces consumers to believe they have observed two deviations from the tested separating
equilibrium. We claim that this should not occur, and that consumers should hold beliefs
consistent with the information contained in the strategy of the non deviating ￿rm as well as
the information of the deviation itself, whenever possible.
Following Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a), we require candidate separating equilibria
to be Resistant to Equilibrium Defections.














H). An equilibrium pro￿le ((pL;aL);(pH;aH)) is
















The idea behind this re￿nement is as follows. Suppose that consumers expect to see (pH;aH)





from the low-quality producer. Suppose






L) is consistent with some alternative
separating equilibrium play of a low-quality ￿rm, and if (p0
H;a0
H) is consistent with some
(possibly di￿erent) separating equilibrium play of a high-quality ￿rm, then consumers have
21enough information to infer that (p0
H;a0
H) is played by the high-quality ￿rm with probability
one. When the re￿nement REDE is silent, the beliefs are still speci￿ed as being pessimistic
as in Proposition 2.
Consider the low-quality ￿rm ￿rst. The imposition of the REDE criterion on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs has no consequences for that producer. Indeed, any unilateral and non-
mimicking deviation from a putative equilibrium pro￿le ((pL;aL);(pH;aH)) leads consumers
to infer that the deviating ￿rm produces low quality. But the equilibrium has been con-
structed such that those deviations are suboptimal. From the low-quality ￿rm perspective,
this inference remains unchanged under REDE. The same is true for any mimicking deviation.
Now, consider the high-quality ￿rm. A deviation from (pH;aH) 2 ­ to (p0
H;a0
H) = 2 ­
falls under the belief system de￿ned for Proposition 2. Such a deviation is, by construction,
not pro￿table. But the REDE criterion has a large impact on the high-quality ￿rm when
considering deviations to (p0
H;a0
H) 2 ­, since such deviations are no longer believed to come
from a low-quality ￿rm. Therefore, there could exist deviations to strategies in ­ that are
pro￿table to the high-quality ￿rm, thus eliminating the separating equilibrium under scrutiny.
To survive the REDE criterion, a separating equilibrium pro￿le ((pL;aL);(pH;aH)) must be
such that the high-quality ￿rm does not want to deviate to some other strategy (p0
H;a0
H) 2 ­,
given (pL;aL) = (pB
L(pH);0). In other words, (pH;aH) must be, in the set ­, a best response
to (pL;aL) = (pB
L(pH);0).
To establish the next Proposition, let us de￿ne D1 = fd j 1 ¸ d > ½g (note that if ½ > 1,
then D1 = ?). Similarly, let us denote D2 = fd j ½ ¸ d > ½=3g and D3 = fd j ½=3 ¸ d ¸ 0g.
Also de￿ne D = D1 [ D2 [ D3.

















(i) when d 2 D1 6= ?, then p¤
H = ¢ + td,
(ii) when d 2 D2 6= ?, then p¤
H = c + 2td;
(iii) when d 2 D3 6= ?, then p¤
H = ¢ ¡ td.
Proof: See Appendix D.¥
224.4.2 Re￿ning pooling equilibria
As we have mentioned earlier, requiring Resistance to Equilibrium Defection has no e￿ect on
the set of pooling equilibrium pro￿les. We thus apply the logic of the Intuitive Criterion as
follows. If (p0;a0) 6= (p;a) is a deviation which is equilibrium dominated for the low-quality
￿rm but not for the high-quality ￿rm, then consumers should not put a positive weight on the
























then we must have ¹((p0;a0);(p;a)) = 1:
It means that if there exists a deviation to (p0;a0) that would, with the best possible
beliefs (or the most optimistic beliefs), make the high quality ￿rm better o￿ but not the
low-quality ￿rm, then consumers should understand that this deviation can only come from
the high-quality ￿rm, and thus should infer ¹((p0;a0);(p;a)) = 1: This contradicts the system
of beliefs that supports pooling equilibria in Proposition 3, where we assumed that consumers
infer that any deviating ￿rm is of low-quality.
Let us show that such a deviation from a pooling equilibrium pro￿le always exists. We
can restrict our search to a deviation (p0;a), which is pro￿table for the high-quality ￿rm but
not for the low-quality one, with respect to any (p;a) 2 ¡. Conditions (17) and (18) require

























(p ¡ c) ¡ a: (20)
Take a closer look at inequality (19), and let us de￿ne D as the set of prices p0 satisfying









we can write D = [0;p0]
S








2p, we can write













(p ¡ c) > 0
, ¡c
p ¡ p0 + ¢
2td
> 0:
Straightforward algebra shows that p0 is greater that p+¢, implying that the latter inequality
is satis￿ed.12
In conclusion, a deviation from (p;a) 2 ¡ to (p0;a) would be, with the most optimistic
beliefs, strictly pro￿table for the high-quality ￿rm, while it would leave the pro￿t of the low-
quality ￿rm unchanged. To avoid any ambiguity, we can consider a deviation to (p0 + ²;a),
² positive but small, such that this deviation strictly bene￿ts the high-quality ￿rm while the
low-quality ￿rm can only be strictly worse o￿. Therefore, any pooling equilibrium (p;a) 2 ¡
can be shown to be non intuitive, because there always exists a deviation to a di￿erent price
that could bene￿t the high-quality ￿rm but would be detrimental to the low-quality ￿rm.
This result relies on the single-crossing property of pro￿t curves that also holds in the
standard signaling literature. This property re￿ects that a high-quality ￿rm is more willing
to signal than the low-quality one. In other words, it is less costly for the high-quality ￿rm
to distort its actions (notably its price) than for the low-quality ￿rm. Formally, a ￿rm’s
marginal pro￿t (for given locations and price-advertising pair (¹ p;¹ a) chosen by its competitor)


















Observe that this property is satis￿ed as long as marginal costs are type-dependent. A
marginal upward price distortion, translating into a marginal reduction in sales, involves a
loss that amounts to p for the low-quality ￿rm, but only to p¡c for the high-quality ￿rm. Were
marginal costs not type-dependent, intuitive beliefs would have no impact on the multiplicity






p + ¢ + td +
p





Making use of the results from the preceding subsection, we ￿rst note that the type of separat-
ing equilibrium depends in particular on which set Di (i = 1;2 or 3) the parameter ½ belongs
to. Denoting ¦L(d) and ¦H(d) ￿rms pro￿ts evaluated at the separating equilibrium described
in Proposition 4, we can compute a ￿rm’s expected pro￿t E¦(d) = 1
2¦H(d) + 1
2¦L(d) and
look for its maximum with respect to d. We get the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 Whenever ¢ ¸ c, the equilibrium is separating and involves either maximal
or minimal horizontal di￿erentiation. More precisely,
(i) when 0 · ½ · 1, horizontal di￿erentiation is maximal, d¤ = 1, with p¤
H = ¢ + t;
(ii) when 1 < ½ · 3 ¡
p
2, horizontal di￿erentiation is also maximal, d¤ = 1, but with
p¤
H = c + 2t;
(iii) and when 3 ¡
p
2 < ½, horizontal di￿erentiation is minimal, d¤ = 0, with p¤
H = ¢ and
only the high-quality ￿rm is active.
Proof: See Appendix E.¥
Tables 2 and 3 summarize equilibrium prices, advertising expenditures, locations and
ex-post pro￿ts. As in the symmetric information situation, consumers face a duopoly or a
monopoly, depending on the relative quality di￿erential ½. Nevertheless, the critical threshold
above which a high-quality monopoly will arise is di￿erent, as emphasized in the following
Corollary.
Corollary 1 The equilibrium of the signalling game exhibits maximum horizontal di￿erenti-
ation for a larger interval of ½ compared to the symmetric information benchmark.
Recall from Section 3 that both ￿rms are active for ½ 2 [0;1:146]. As Proposition 5 shows, the
separating equilibrium involves a duopoly for ½ < 3¡
p
2 ¼ 1:586. Hence, for ½ 2 [1:146;1:586],
asymmetric information modi￿es the structure of the market.
13In Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a), marginal costs are type-independent, and the authors de￿ne impar-
tial out-of-equilibrium beliefs that restrict consumers inferences after a deviation from a pooling equilibrium.
25As summarized in Table 2, signaling high quality involves positive advertising, whatever
the relative quality di￿erential ½. In addition, as long as both ￿rms are active in the market,
the high-quality ￿rm must distort its price upward to truthfully reveal its type. Consequently,
the low-quality ￿rm adopts a higher price in the separating equilibrium than under symmetric
information, since prices are strategic complements.
Overall, the low-quality duopolist bene￿ts from asymmetric information. In regions §1
and §2, in which its market share is positive, its pro￿ts are higher than under symmetric
information. Not only the price of the low quality good is higher in the separating equilibrium,















6 when ½ 2 §2. Higher prices
drive some consumers to purchase the low-quality good, whereas they would have bought the
high-quality one, had information been symmetric.
Conversely, the high-quality ￿rm loses from asymmetric information, since it bears the
signaling activity and its subsequent cost. The upward distortion in price has two opposite
e￿ects on variable pro￿ts. On the one hand, the price charged to customers is higher. But
on the other hand, the market share of the high-quality ￿rm is reduced at the bene￿t of its
low-quality competitor. Furthermore, the high-quality ￿rm has to burn money on dissipative
advertising. Overall, it is easily checked that the last two e￿ects outweigh the ￿rst one, and
that the high-quality ￿rm’s pro￿ts are lower under asymmetric information.
It is interesting to note that, under asymmetric information, the high-quality ￿rm will not
always earn less than the low-quality one, as it would be the case in a monopoly signaling
game, in which by construction the high-quality monopolist would realize a pro￿t lower than
its low-quality alter ego. In the present context, the high-quality duopolist will obtain a pro￿t
higher than its low-quality competitor as long as the relative quality di￿erential ½ is greater
than 1 + c
t. Let us stress that this ￿nding follows from the de￿nition of consumers utility
function in which it is assumed that R, the basic surplus obtained by purchasing any of the
two commodities, is high enough that all consumers always buy a unit of good and the entire
market is always covered.
From the consumers’ perspective, asymmetric information has a negative impact when
½ < 1:146. Both ￿rms charge higher prices than under symmetric information, thus reducing
26consumers surplus unambiguously. When ½ > 1:586, the high-quality ￿rm monopolizes the
market and charges the same price whatever the informational structure, and consumers sur-
plus is not a￿ected. For ½ 2 [1:146;1:586], asymmetric information enables the low-quality
￿rm to remain active, which could have a positive e￿ect on consumers surplus. Nevertheless,
straightforward calculations show that consumers surplus is lower under asymmetric informa-
tion and a duopoly regime than under symmetric information with a high-quality monopoly.
In region §3, ¢ is so large that producing low-quality is not pro￿table at the ￿nal stage of
the game. Ex ante, both ￿rms choose identical locations, each of them expecting to monopolize
the market with a high quality good. In this region, prices are not distorted, compared to
the symmetric information benchmark (in both cases, pH = ¢), and dissipative advertising
only signals high quality. As a result, consumers do not su￿er from the signaling activity.
However, the high-quality ￿rm earns less because of the necessity to signal its type through
costly advertising. Finally, the cost of advertising is increasing in the quality di￿erential in
region §3.
The evolution of advertising aH depends on the region we consider. While it is clearly
decreasing in ¢ in region §2, it is increasing in ¢ in regions §1 and §3. Hence the cost of
advertising is non monotonic in the quality gap ¢, which is reminiscent of results obtained
by Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001a) in a di￿erent setting.






§1 : 0 · ½ · 1 1 t ¢ + t ¢
2 0
§2 : 1 < ½ · 3 ¡
p
2 1 t
2 (3 ¡ ½) c + 2t c+2t
2 ¡ t
8 (3 ¡ ½)
2 0
§3 : 3 ¡
p
2 < ½ 0 0 ¢ ¢
2 0









§2 : 1 < ½ · 3 ¡
p
2 t
8 (3 ¡ ½)
2 1
2 (¢ ¡ 2c ¡ t) + t
8 (3 ¡ ½)
2
§3 : 3 ¡
p
2 < ½ 0 t½ ¡ ¢
2
Table 3: Equilibrium values for ex-post pro￿ts
275 Conclusion
We have constructed a duopoly model in which goods are horizontally and vertically dif-
ferentiated. Vertical di￿erentiation is exogenous, and which ￿rm produces which quality is
exogenously and randomly determined. Firms must choose their location (which can be in-
terpreted geographically or in terms of product design) before quality uncertainty is resolved.
But at the ￿nal stage, they are privately informed of their types, and want to reveal informa-
tion to their customers.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on quality signaling in an imperfectly
competitive environment. We show that pure price signaling is impossible, whatever the
degree of vertical di￿erentiation. In the present context, pure price signaling could be achieved
thanks to a downward price distortion, resulting in the high-quality ￿rm monopolizing the
market. Consequently, the low-quality ￿rm would make zero pro￿t, and thus would have
strong incentives to deviate and mimic any strategy its high-quality rival would choose.
Dissipative advertising is crucial to the existence of separating equilibria. The possibility
to combine price and advertising expenditures to signal high quality results in an upward
distortion of both prices, except when vertical di￿erentiation is so large that only producing
high quality is pro￿table. In this latter case, the high-quality price is not distorted, and
dissipative advertising alone is used to deter the low-quality ￿rm from mimicking its high-
quality rival. In the former case where vertical di￿erentiation is not too large, an upward
distortion in price endows the high-quality ￿rm with a pro￿t su￿ciently high that it can a￿ord
to make dissipative expenditures on advertising. Since prices are strategic complements, the
increase of the price of the low-quality good follows from the signaling activity of the high-
quality ￿rm.
Asymmetric information also has some consequences on ￿rms location choices. Indeed,
compared to the symmetric information benchmark, maximum horizontal di￿erentiation oc-
curs for a larger set of parameter values. Therefore, in our setting, incomplete information
yields more horizontal di￿erentiation.
Some possible extensions of the present paper come to mind that seem rather natural.
One of them would be to study an alternative timing, where location choice can act as a
signal of quality, as in Vettas (1999). Consumers would receive two sequential messages,
28￿rst ￿rms location choices, then their decisions on the combination of price and advertising
expenditures. This timing might give more opportunities for a high-quality ￿rm to reveal its
type, but would also involve complex inferences on the consumer side.
Another possible extension would generalize the present setting to include the possibility
that ￿rms can make (potentially observable) decisions like investment early in the game, that
could a￿ect the realization of quality which would remain private information to the ￿rms.
Such a setting would involve both moral hazard and adverse selection issues, and studying
their interactions would undoubtedly yield interesting results.
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31Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2












(pH + td ¡ ¢)
and 0 · z¤(pB
L(pH);pH;0) · 1 is then equivalent to the following condition
maxfc;¢ ¡ tdg · pH · ¢ + 3td:
This gives us a lower and upper bound for pH, such that demands are positive for both ￿rms.












(pH + td ¡ ¢)2:
This expression shows that aH is an inverted parabola function of pH, which is symmetric on
the interval I = [¢ ¡ td;¢ + 3td], and reaches its maximum in pH = ¢ + td.









(pH ¡ c)(3td ¡ pH + ¢) ¡
1
4
(pH + td ¡ ¢ ¡ 2c)
which is also an inverted parabola. Its maximum is reached in pH = ¢+c
2 +td, which is lower
than ¢ + td, since by assumption c < ¢:
Let us compute the di￿erence between aH and aH :
aH ¡ aH =
1
4td
(pH ¡ c)(3td ¡ pH + ¢) ¡
1
4










(pH ¡ td ¡ ¢)(2c ¡ pH + td ¡ ¢):
This is again an inverted parabola which is positive only between the roots ¢ + td and
2c + td ¡ ¢: Given that c < ¢, the upper root is ¢ + td > 0:
Hence the set of admissible separating prices pH, i. e. high-quality prices satisfying
32necessary conditions (11) and (12), is non empty and such that
maxfc; ¢ ¡ td; 2c + td ¡ ¢g · pH · ¢ + td:
More precisely, as we have the following inequalities:
2c + td ¡ ¢ > c , d > ½ =
¢ ¡ c
t
¢ ¡ td > c , d < ½
2c + td ¡ ¢ > ¢ ¡ td , d > ½;
it follows that when ½ ¸ d, the set of admissible pH is the interval [¢ ¡ td;¢ + td], while
when ½ < d, the set of admissible pH is [2c + td ¡ ¢;¢ + td]. This completes the proof.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a putative equilibrium ((~ pH;~ aH);(~ pL;~ aL)). We choose the following out-of-equilibrium
beliefs:
¹(p;a; ~ pH;~ aH) = 0 for any (p;a) = 2 f(~ pH;~ aH);(~ pL;~ aL)g
¹(~ pL;~ aL;p;a) = 1 for any (p;a) = 2 f(~ pH;~ aH);(~ pL;~ aL)g:
These beliefs are such that, if one ￿rm is playing according to a separating equilibrium strategy
(whether the high- or low-quality ￿rm), and the other one is deviating to a strategy o￿ the
equilibrium path, then the latter is immediately perceived as a low-quality ￿rm by consumers.
These beliefs are the most pessimistic for a deviating ￿rm, and support the largest possible
set of separating pro￿les.
We ￿rst check that the low-quality ￿rm has no incentives to deviate. Indeed, it is clear
from the above de￿nition of beliefs that any deviation to (p;a) 6= (~ pH;~ aH) by this ￿rm
does not a￿ect consumers perception of its type. From the necessary conditions for the
existence of separating equilibria, the best response to these beliefs and the rival’s action is
(~ pL;~ aL) 2 argmaxp;a ¼L(p;a; ~ pH;0), implying that (p;a) is suboptimal. In addition, deviating
by mimicking the high-quality behavior (~ pH;~ aH) leads to ¹((~ pH;~ aH);(~ pH;~ aH)) = 1
2: However,
33by virtue of necessary condition (ICL), this deviation is suboptimal.
We now show that the high-quality ￿rm has no incentives to deviate. First, deviating by
mimicking the low-quality ￿rm’s equilibrium strategy leads to ¹((~ pL;~ aL);(~ pL;~ aL)) = 1
2 and
from necessary condition (ICH), this deviation is suboptimal.
Second, if the high-quality ￿rm deviates to p 6= ~ pL, then by the de￿nition of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs, consumers will believe that it is selling low quality (and that the rival
￿rm is o￿ering the high-quality product), as ¹((~ pL;~ aL);(p;a)) = 1. It then follows that
the high-quality ￿rm has no incentives to spend money in useless advertising, so that it will
choose a = 0. In such a deviation, the demand DL=H addressed to the high-quality ￿rm when
perceived by consumers as o￿ering a low-quality product is given by:






~ pL ¡ p ¡ ¢
2td
¶
and the corresponding (concave) payo￿ is:
¼d









The best deviation pd(6= ~ pL) from ~ pH is such that pd 2 argmaxp ¼d





~ pL + c ¡ ¢
2
: (22)
Recall from Lemma 1 that ~ pL = 1
2[~ pH + td ¡ ¢]: Substituting this expression into (22), we






(~ pH + 3(td ¡ ¢) ¡ 2c)
2
which is de￿ned only for ~ pH ¸ p1
H ´ 3(¢ ¡ td) + 2c to ensure positive demand and markup.
We now prove that playing the best deviation (pd;0) is dominated by playing the putative
equilibrium strategy (~ pH;~ aH). For this, it su￿ces to prove that (pd;0) is dominated by the
mimicking strategy (~ pL;~ aL) = (1
2[~ pH + td ¡ ¢];0). Indeed, by Condition (ICH), mimicking a
34low quality producer is already suboptimal.
The pro￿t obtained when a high-quality producer mimics the low-quality producer is
¼H
µ












which is only de￿ned for ~ pH ¸ p2




~ pL;~ aL; ~ pL; 1
2
¢
, we obtain a convex quadratic form in ~ pH which roots are
given by 2c + td + 3¢ § 4
p
td¢: This di￿erence is thus non positive between the roots.
There are two cases depending on whether d is lower or greater than ¢=t. First, when
d · ¢=t, then ¢ ¡ td ¸ 0: Hence, p2
H · p1
H, which means that the pro￿t from mimicking
is higher than the pro￿t from deviating, ¼d
L=H, whenever ~ pH is lower than the upper root
(2c + td + 3¢ + 4
p
td¢): But recall from Lemma 2 that the maximal admissible ~ pH for a
separating equilibrium to exist is ¢ + td, which is clearly lower than this upper root. It
follows that for the admissible values of ~ pH, the mimicking strategy is always preferred to the
best (non mimicking) deviation strategy.
Second, when d ¸ ¢=t, then ¢ ¡ td · 0. In that case, recall that from Lemma 2 that
the set of admissible ~ pH for separation is [2c + td ¡ ¢;¢ + td]: We just have shown that
the maximal value ¢ + td is lower than the upper root. It remains to show that the lowest
admissible value 2c + td ¡ ¢ is higher than the lower root 2c + td + 3¢ ¡
p
td¢ :
2c + td ¡ ¢ ¡
³











as d ¸ ¢=t: Hence, once again, for the admissible values of ~ pH, the mimicking deviation is
always preferred to the best (non mimicking) deviation. This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 3

















from (7). Solving this maximization problem, we ￿nd that
the optimal deviation is (p0;a0) =
¡1
2(p + td ¡ ¢);0
¢
. Consequently, after substituting, the









(p + td ¡ ¢)
2
which is only de￿ned for p 2 [max(c;¢ ¡ td);¢ + 3td].14 The pooling equilibrium pro￿t for











Hence, condition (15) reduces to:






(p + td ¡ ¢)
2 : (23)
The function aH(p;p;0) is an inverted parabola function of p which is positive on the interval
between the roots, [®;¯] ´ [td + ¢ ¡ 2
p
¢td; td + ¢ + 2
p
¢td]:
Looking at condition (16), it is easy to see that it yields a similar region in space (p;a)










































and consequently, maxp0;a0 ¼H (p0;a0;p;0) = 1
8td (p + td ¡ c ¡ ¢)
2 which is only de￿ned for
p 2 [max(c;¢ ¡ td + c);¢ + 3td + c]: Finally, condition (16) reduces to:
0 · a · aH(p ¡ c;p ¡ c;0) =
1
2
(p ¡ c) ¡
1
8td
(p ¡ c + td ¡ ¢)
2 : (24)
Similarly, the function aH(p ¡ c;p ¡ c;0) de￿nes an inverted parabola function of p, positive
14This de￿nition set ensures that p
0 ¸ 0 and that z
¤(p
0;p;0) 2 [0;1].
36on the interval between the roots [°;±] = [td + ¢ + c ¡ 2
p
¢td; td + ¢ + c + 2
p
¢td]: We
are done if we can prove that the two regions de￿ned by (23) and (24) in the space (p;a)
intersect. Because ® < ° and ¯ < ±, [®;¯]
T
[°;±] 6= 0 if and only if ° · ¯ :
td + ¢ + c ¡ 2
p
¢td · td + ¢ + 2
p
¢td
which reduces to d ¸ c2=16¢t: Finally, note that ° = td + ¢ + c ¡ 2
p
¢td is greater than c,
since
td + ¢ + c ¡ 2
p





This ensures that the high-quality ￿rm gets a positive markup at any pooling equilibrium.
This concludes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 4
We have already explained in the text that the imposition of REDE on the low-quality ￿rm
has no impact on its incentive to deviate from the equilibrium pro￿le. Therefore, the re￿ned






On the contrary, for the high-quality ￿rm, the imposition of REDE makes some de-
viations pro￿table. Quite obviously, any separating equilibrium pro￿le ((pH;aH);(pL;aL))
with aH > aH(pH;pB




L(pH);0). Indeed, beliefs are required to be ¹((pL;0);(pH;aH)) = ¹((pL;0);(pH;a0
H)) =
0 (since (pH;a0
H) 2 ­), and thus implies that the high-quality ￿rm obtains a strictly higher
pro￿t by reducing its advertising expenditures. Clearly, for a given price pH, there is no incen-
tives for the high-quality producer to spend more than the minimum level aH(pH;pB
L(pH);0)
of dissipative advertising required for separation. Given this remark, we study the payo￿ of
the high-quality ￿rm:
¼s



























(pH + td ¡ ¢)
2 :
37It can easily be checked that ¼s
H(pH) is an inverted parabola with its maximum at pH = c+2td.
We then have to rank c+2td with the lower and upper bounds of admissible prices pH. Given
that we have the following inequalities:
c + 2td > ¢ ¡ td , d > ½=3
c + 2td > 2c + td ¡ ¢ , d + ½ > 0 which is always true
c + 2td > ¢ + td , d > ½;
we are left with three possible regimes.
² for d > ½, the set of admissible prices pH is [2c + td ¡ ¢;¢ + td] and as c+2td > ¢+td,
clearly ¼s
H(pH) is increasing on this interval. The highest payo￿ for the high-quality
￿rm is then obtained when pH = ¢ + td, i.e.
¼s




² for ½ ¸ d > ½=3, the set of admissible prices pH is [¢ ¡ td;¢ + td] and c + 2td belongs
to this interval. Consequently, the highest payo￿ for the high-quality ￿rm is obtained
for pH = c + 2td, i.e.
¼s
H(c + 2td) =
1
2
(¢ ¡ 2c ¡ td) +
1
8td
(c + 3td ¡ ¢)
2 :
² for ½=3 ¸ d ¸ 0, the set of admissible prices pH is still [¢ ¡ td;¢ + td], but ¼s
H(pH) is
now decreasing on this interval because c + 2td < ¢ ¡ td. Consequently, the highest
payo￿ for the high-quality ￿rm is obtained when pH = ¢ ¡ td, i.e.
¼s
H(¢ ¡ td) =
1
2
(¢ ¡ td) ¡ c.
This concludes the proof.
38E Proof of Proposition 5
From Proposition 4, we have for:
² d 2 D3, p¤
H = ¢ ¡ td so that ¦H = 1
2(¢ ¡ td) ¡ c. In addition, p¤
L = pB
L(¢ ¡ td) =
1




(¢ ¡ td) ¡
c
2
which is decreasing in d over the set D3.
² d 2 D2, p¤
H = c + 2td and ¦H = 1
2 (¢ ¡ 2c ¡ td) + 1




L(c + 2td) = 1
2[c + 3td ¡ ¢] and we have ¦L = 1





(¢ ¡ 2c ¡ td) +
1
8td






7t2d2 + 2t(c ¡ 2¢)d + (¢ ¡ c)2¢
:
Studying this function for positive values of d reveals that it is convex, ￿rst decreasing,
reaching a unique minimum at d = ½=
p
7, and then increasing.
² d 2 D1, p¤
H = ¢ + td and ¦H = td¡c
2 . Moreover, p¤
L = pB
L(¢ + td) = td and ¦L = td
2 .













which is clearly increasing in d.
Given that the function E¦(d) is continuous over [0;1]\D, it is clear from those results that
E¦(d) is ￿rst decreasing then increasing. Hence, the maximum of E¦(d) is obtained either









> > > > <
> > > > :
t
2 ¡ c




7t2 + 2t(c ¡ 2¢) + (¢ ¡ c)2¢
for 1 · ½ < 3
1
4(¢ ¡ t) ¡ c
2 for ½ ¸ 3
39We easily obtain that E¦(0) > E¦(1) whenever ½ ¸ 3. Hence, di￿erentiation is minimal in
equilibrium, with only the high-quality ￿rm being active. For ½ < 1, we have

















(½ ¡ 2) < 0
so that maximal di￿erentiation prevails. For 1 · ½ < 3, we have





















This quadratic form in ½ is non positive for 1 · ½ < 3 ¡
p
2 and positive for 3 ¡
p
2 · ½ < 3.
Consequently, we have maximal di￿erentiation (d = 1) for 0 · ½ < 3 ¡
p
2 and minimal
di￿erentiation for ½ ¸ 3 ¡
p
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Figure 3: Set ­ when d ¸ ½:
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